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Abstract 49 
Scientific Advisory Bodies (SAB) are seen as “boundary organisations” working at the 50 
interface between science, policy and society. Although their narrowly defined remit of risk 51 
assessment is anchored in notions of rationality, objectivity, and reason, in reality, their 52 
sources for developing recommendations are not limited to scientific evidence. There is a 53 
growing expectation to involve non-scientific sources of information in the formation of 54 
knowledge, including the expectation of stakeholder consultation in forming 55 
recommendations.  Such move towards “democratisation” of scientific processes of decision 56 
making within SABs has been described and often studied as “post-normal science” (PNS) 57 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). In the current paper we examine the application of PNS in 58 
practice through a study of stakeholder consultations within the workings of the UK 59 
Scientific Advisory Committee for Nutrition (SACN). We use the theoretical insights from 60 
PNS-related studies to structure the analysis and examine the way in which PNS tenets 61 
resonate with the practices of SACN. We have selected a particular case of the SACN UK 62 
recommendations for salt as it is characterized by scientific controversy, uncertainty, vested 63 
interests and value conflict. We apply the tenets of PNS through documentary  analysis of 64 
the SACN Salt Subgroup (SSG) consultation documents published in 2002/2003: the minutes 65 
of the 5 SACN SSG’s meetings which included summary of the SACN SSG’s stakeholder 66 
consultation and the SSG’s responses to the consultation. The analysis suggests that the 67 
SACN consultation can be construed as a process of managing sources of risk to its 68 
organisation. Thus, rather than being an evidence of post normal scientific practice, 69 
engagement became a mechanism for confirming the specific framing of science that is 70 
resonant with technocratic models of science holding authority over the facts. The 71 
implications for PNS theory are discussed. 72 
Introduction 73 
Post Normal Science (PNS) is a theoretical framework developed by Funtowicz and Ravetz 74 
(1993) to denote a new way of production of science that is required in the context of high 75 
scientific uncertainty and high stake (interest), when the problems are multifaceted and 76 
decisions are urgent. Within this context, scientific process, traditionally confined to 77 
scientific peer community, is seen to benefit from engagement with an extended peer 78 
community that includes many perspectives and values. Arguably, scientific advisory 79 
committees are the site within which PNS practice is most visible (Lorenzoni et al, 2007) due 80 
to their boundary position between science and policy (Guston, 2001). We report on a case 81 
study of the Scientific Advisory Committee for Nutrition in its efforts to engage a wider 82 
network of stakeholders in the processes of setting recommendations for salt. Uniquely, the 83 
case study examines the actual consultation outputs throughout the recommendations 84 
setting process. We  apply the analytical framework developed by Turnpenny et al (2009) to 85 
capture the elements of practice within SABs that can be described as “post-normal 86 
science”, and critically evaluate the application of the concept. The current article reflects 87 
on the extent to which PNS is a helpful lens through which the processes of engagement 88 
within SABs are explained and theorised.  89 
The remainder of this introduction unfolds as follows: we will first give an overview 90 
of PNS theoretical framework and the aligned notion of democratisation of science, then 91 
review the policy origins of the calls for democratisation of science with a particular 92 
reference to the workings of SABs. We will then describe the case of SACN reviewing both 93 
the policy context and the institutional characteristics of the SACN.  94 
Post normal science and democratisation of science 95 
PNS is a step change in our understanding of the practices of science, diverging from  96 
Kuhn’s (1962) framing of “normal” science. “Normal” science is characterised by a high 97 
degree of scientific consensus about the scientific approaches, until such time that the on-98 
going critical reflections of scientists reach a point of “paradigm shift”. In contrast to this, 99 
the new, “post-normal” approach to scientific practice reflects the emergence of complex, 100 
multifaceted and multidisciplinary nature of problems (defined as “wicked” problems), 101 
which in turn call for the inclusion of multiple perspectives and values. Broadening of the 102 
scientific practice from the traditional (scientific) peer community to the extended 103 
community of peers is seen as necessary for a number of reasons. It is believed that it 104 
enables scrutiny of assumptions and questions (Nowotny, 2003), that it ensures that ethical 105 
dimensions of social problems are not overlooked through scientific evidence production, 106 
and that it leads to trust in the decisions of the regulator (Parliament Office of Science and 107 
Technology, 2001; Government Office for Science, 2009; Government Office for Science, 108 
2007a,b; Wynne, 2006). According to PNS framework, the “extended peer community” (Rosa 109 
1998)  as the community  of individuals who should be included into scientific deliberation 110 
either because they are affected by the issue or can provide perspectives that broaden and 111 
extend the framing of the problem, make quality judgments of the scientific process based 112 
on considerations of values as well as scientific facts (Turnpenny, Jones and Lorenzoni, 113 
2011). 114 
The concepts of PNS and the extended peer community have been in wide use for 115 
the past couple of decades, both as a theoretical framework to explain and guide the 116 
relationship between science, policy and broader society, and as a method developed to 117 
identify the contexts – issues, stakes and uncertainties - that call for the extended peer 118 
community in scientific practice (Turnpenny, Lorenzoni Jones, 2009). The studies employing 119 
PNS as a framework have used it to identify the “wicked” problems - issues characterised by 120 
uncertainty, value inconsistency, urgency and heterogeneity of visions and epistemologies - 121 
that call for the adoption of post normal scientific practice (e.g. Saloranta, 2001); and to 122 
explain the processes of science in practice in the light of PNS (e.g. Turnpenny Lorenzoni and 123 
Jones, 2009; Petersen et al, 2011). Among the more enduring debates about PNS is the 124 
extent to which it represents a normative framework for scientific practice and its links to 125 
policy, or rather, is a theoretical model, a description or a heuristic (Farrell, 2011) that offers 126 
an explanatory framework for this interaction as it happens in practice. The growing critique 127 
of PNS framework questions some of its unexamined assumptions that ascribe a normative 128 
role to the extended peer community as “quality control” (Wesselink and Hoppe, 2011). 129 
More recent examination of the processes of the EPC through alternative theoretical angles 130 
such as risk colonisation (Rothstein et al, 2006a,b), showed how application of the concept 131 
can be played out in practice with unintended consequences that are at variance with the 132 
values of inclusivity, information completeness and heterogeneity. In a similar vein,  Walls et 133 
al. (2010) have demonstrated how the pressures for openness and engagement can lead to 134 
selective transparency by making obvious only those elements of scientific decisions 135 
characterised by consensus and uniformity. It is argued that the current procedure for 136 
linking democratic control and risk assessment as the two modalities of decision-making 137 
within a SAB can lead to institutional deficiency and diminished legitimacy (Ferretti, 2007, 138 
Bijker et al., 2009).  This raises an issue of the applicability of PNS aims in practice, their 139 
compatibility with the traditional governance approaches, and their relationship with 140 
aligned concepts of better governance such as accountability and transparency. This is 141 
particularly relevant to the workings of scientific advisory committees. The way in which 142 
PNS aims are reflected in policy discourse related to the workings of scientific advisory 143 
bodies will be examined below. 144 
Policy rationales for the extended peer community in the operations of SABs 145 
Scientific Advisory Committees are seen as “boundary organisations” working at the 146 
interface between science, policy and society (Guston, 2001), which makes them clear 147 
contenders for the post normal scientific practice. Historically, however, they have been 148 
tasked with risk assessment, that is the technical decision making of experts who engage in 149 
systematic, analytical, and largely probabilistic thinking to characterise hazard, model its 150 
distribution, and estimate its risk (Renn, 1998). The past 10-15 years have witnessed a great 151 
deal of regulation of this process through clear guidelines of when and how SABs are 152 
convened, the mechanisms through which their decisions are made and conveyed (as 153 
exemplified in Codes of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees (Office of Science and 154 
Technology, 2001; Chilvers, 2008; Liberatore and Funtowitz, 2003; Scientific Advisory 155 
Committee on Nutrition, 2002).  156 
The principles of scientific universalism and independence enshrined in definitions of 157 
risk assessment have been under increasing scrutiny. Various documents such as the House 158 
of Lords report (House of Lords, 2000) in the UK, Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory 159 
Committees 2001 (Office of Science and Technology, 2001), Science in Society Action Plan 160 
(European Commission, 2001), and Communication on Collection and Use of Expertise 161 
(European Commission, 2002) in the EU emphasised the requirement of SABs to seek 162 
external input on their decisions, broaden the basis on which they are made, increase 163 
transparency, and ensure active acceptance by those who will be implementing them.  164 
Consequently, the framing of SABs’ role and practices as embodied in policy 165 
documents contains a dichotomy of the competing and simultaneous emphasis upon the 166 
technocratic bases of policy (“normal science”) and the ethos of stakeholder engagement 167 
(or extended peer community). For example, alongside the EC Science and Society Action 168 
Plan (European Commission, 2001), which calls for democratisation of expertise, is the 169 
enshrining of the key principle of scientific independence from external constraints (in the 170 
Part II of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution in Europe, 2003, Article II:13 (European 171 
Commission, 2003). An interesting and thus far unexamined question of both practical and 172 
conceptual importance therefore is whether and how the twin pressures (implicit within 173 
policy documents) of engagement and scientific independence can co-exist within the 174 
workings of SABs. The examination of this tension in the current paper will focus on the 175 
operational aspects of SACN and the strategies used to manage the consultation 176 
procedures.  177 
Aim of the paper 178 
The aim of the current paper is to examine the application of PNS in practice through 179 
a study of the Scientific Advisory Committee for Nutrition (SACN). We use the theoretical 180 
insights from PNS-related studies to structure the analysis and examine the way in which 181 
PNS aims resonate with the practices of the boundary organization such as SACN. We have 182 
selected a particular case of SACN recommendations for salt, the scientific area that is 183 
characterized by controversy, uncertainty, vested interests and conflict, and can therefore 184 
be described as a “wicked problem”. We apply the frame of PNS through documentary 185 
analysis. 186 
The Case of SACN UK and the Analytical Framework 187 
 The Scientific Advisory Committee for Nutrition (SACN) UK 188 
SACN provides a potentially interesting case since its formation and the replacement 189 
of its predecessor, the Committee of Medical Aspects of Food and Nutrition Policy (COMA) 190 
was explicitly driven by the expressed need for clear separation between risk assessment 191 
and risk management, as this institutional reform aimed to remove policy considerations 192 
from the remit of the scientific committee. Like COMA before, SACN (UK) brings together 193 
independent experts who provide advice to the government department primarily 194 
responsible for nutrition policy – until recently, the Food Standards Agency and now the 195 
Department of Health– as well as other government agencies and departments. Its remit 196 
includes matters concerning nutrient content of individual foods, advice on diet, and the 197 
nutritional status of people in the UK. The Committee members are appointed as 198 
independent scientific experts on the basis of their specific skills and knowledge (mostly in 199 
nutrition and biomedical sciences, but also in social sciences) and typically hold a Chair in 200 
academic institutions. There are also two lay members representing consumers. SACN is 201 
supported by a secretariat provided by the relevant department in charge, who are selected 202 
for their scientific expertise. This ensures that they can provide comprehensive background 203 
information to SACN members when briefing them about the Terms of Reference and 204 
throughout the decision making process of the Committee. 205 
There are clear guidelines for the conduct of the members (Code of Conduct for 206 
Scientific Advisory Committees 2001, revised in 2007 and then 2011) as well as a document 207 
that specifies the decision making processes in assessing risk (SACN Framework for 208 
Evaluation of Evidence, 2002, revised in 2012). SACN can co-opt experts to form working 209 
groups (‘standing groups’) who meet on an ad hoc basis to discuss specific issues. SACN 210 
subgroups include non-SACN members. The appointment process is less rigorous (as it often 211 
does not follow an open call and application process) and members are selected for their 212 
topic expertise. The subgroups are disbanded once the work is completed. 213 
SACN communicates through reports based on risk assessments and position 214 
statements. They also sometimes engage in consultation exercises with an aim of identifying 215 
relevant evidence to take into consideration or as a way of getting feedback on draft reports 216 
in preparation for a final report. These consultations are usually written communiqués that 217 
invite comments from relevant stakeholder groups; it is at the discretion of SACN whether 218 
to engage with these comments.  219 
SACN publishes minutes of its meetings on its website (http://www.sacn.gov.uk) and 220 
designates consultation summaries as open access. It is these documents from the meetings 221 
of SACN Subgroup for Salt and the consultation summaries (see Table 1 for details) that will 222 
form the basis of our research.  223 
 Analytical Framework 224 
To address whether and to what extent the practice of post-normal science is evident in 225 
the workings of SACN, we have identified themes to develop a coding system, which was 226 
guided on the one hand by the existing literature, and on the other, through inductive 227 
analysis of the data. We found the analytical framework summarized and applied by 228 
Turnpenny et al (2009) particularly useful and resonant with the thematic codes that were 229 
emerging inductively. Turnpenny et al (2009) adapted the key concepts of PNS and 230 
developed a new framework for analysis to suit the needs of their case studies, along the 231 
following themes: 1) Participation 2) Issue framing; 2) Evidence; and 4) Influence of 232 
knowledge. We applied this frame in our analysis of the available documents, which 233 
included the consultation summary. We also refined it since the inductive analysis 234 
suggested an extension of this frame to include decision-making outcomes. The following 235 
key questions linked with the analytical frame helped guide the current processes of 236 
analysis: 237 
• Issue Framing: What constitutes a scientific and political backdrop against which the 238 
issue is framed? How is the problem defined by a) the commissioner; b) the Salt 239 
Subgroup (SSG) 240 
• Participation: How is the SSG composed and overseen? Who constitutes the 241 
extended peer community? What was the mode of engagement? 242 
• Issue framing by the extended peer community: How is the framing of the problem 243 
by the SSG perceived by the extended peer community? Is there evidence of the 244 
conflict in values/interests? 245 
• Evidence: Are there disputes about the nature, quality, selection and interpretation 246 
of evidence? Is this underpinned by value preferences? 247 
• Decision-making outcome:  Is there clarity about how the decision/recommendation 248 
has been reached? Is this disputed and why? 249 
•  Influence of knowledge:  How were the comments of the extended peer community 250 
incorporated into the final report? Whose comments were addressed, and how? 251 
All publicly available documents related to the workings of the SSG were identified, 252 
which included 5 reports on the minutes of meetings of the SSG (the final one of 253 
which included the Subgroup’s response to consultation), a table summarising 254 
submitters’ comments, the draft report, and the final Salt and Health reports (see 255 
Table 1 for the list and summary of the documents).  256 
-Please Insert Table 1- 257 
Analysis 258 
Issue Framing by the Commissioner and the SACN SSG  259 
“Three decades of controversy over the putative benefits of salt reduction show how 260 
the demands of good science clash with the pressures of public health policy.” (Taubes, 261 
1998:898). 262 
 Salt recommendations setting by the SACN UK was set against the backdrop of a 263 
long running, acerbic dispute in nutrition and medicine over the putative risks and benefits 264 
of the nutrient. When the SACN SSG was established to review the evidence on salt, the salt 265 
controversy had been in its full swing, fuelled by a number of scientific uncertainties, value 266 
conflicts and vested interests. The key aspect of the debate is whether a drop of blood 267 
pressure by 1 or 2 millimeters of mercury due to reduction in salt is a sufficient basis for a 268 
prolonged, expensive public health campaign. It is argued that at the individual level, its 269 
effect upon hypertension is considerably smaller than that of drugs, and at the population 270 
level, though significant for the hypertensive, the effect of salt reduction is in fact 271 
insignificant for the majority of the population with normal blood pressure (Swales, 1988; 272 
2000). The existence of the controversy is often attributed to the powerful interests and 273 
lobby groups of food processing industry, who are seen as the principal culprit of the 274 
current intake of salt, most of which is through processed food (Godlee, 1996; McGregor, 275 
1997). 276 
Against such a backdrop in 1994, the UK scientific advisory body for Nutrition – 277 
COMA, the forerunner of the SACN UK, recommended a ‘reduction in the average intake of 278 
sodium by reducing salt intake by a third, from 9g per day to 6g per day’. The 279 
recommendation of COMA did not find its way into policy however, due to a considerable 280 
amount of controversy this triggered within interested parties (particularly the corporate 281 
sector) who disputed the government recommendations. In September 2001, the Food 282 
Standards Agency and the Chief Medical Officer for Wales requested that the newly 283 
established SACN review the evidence and update the previous recommendations made by 284 
COMA, in the light of any new evidence, taking into account the submissions that had been 285 
received from interested parties. In addition, the SACN was asked to consider whether the 286 
evidence for children should be reviewed in order to quantify a recommended amount for 287 
the general population of children (Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition, 2003b). To 288 
this end SACN set up the SSG, which embarked on a series of meetings to evaluate evidence 289 
using the framework of risk assessment developed by SACN in 2002. They in turn launched a 290 
consultation which was conducted in the context of the growing unease of the salt industry 291 
about the mounting scientific evidence that salt increases blood pressure, and the 292 
recognition that most dietary salt (65-85%) is sourced from processed foods. Indeed, food 293 
manufacturers had actively sought to engage with government’s policy on salt with an aim 294 
of minimizing the potentially negative effect upon industry (Godlee, 1996). In recognition of 295 
this, the SSG included three independent experts with academic backgrounds in human 296 
nutrition and epidemiology and a representative of industry. There were six observers from 297 
the Department of Health and the Food Standards Agency. 298 
The SSG’s proceedings began with collation of responses from interested parties. 299 
Responses were received from 11 organisations, all but two of whom were private 300 
corporate organisations and their representatives. The nature of these submissions by the 301 
interested parties was twofold: to contribute to the development of the frame for sourcing 302 
and interpreting evidence and to suggest new evidence for consideration, published since 303 
the last salt recommendations by COMA. Many submissions requested careful 304 
considerations of risks of salt reduction, of reliability of measurements, the range of health 305 
outcomes, the nature of studies (how able are they to capture “habitual” intake). As a result 306 
of this exercise, the SSG drafted statements which provided an important frame for the 307 
further sourcing and interpretation of evidence in terms of: 1) importance of sodium and 308 
understanding physiological requirements for sodium; 2) relative importance of chloride 309 
ion; 3) need to understand salt sensitivity; 4) need to clarify morbidity and mortality 310 
outcomes.  311 
Participation 312 
Following a series of the SSG’s meetings, a draft report was placed on the SACN 313 
website in September 2002 for consultation (please see Table 1 for the summary of the 314 
Draft Report conclusions). After a 3 month consultation period, stakeholder submissions to 315 
the draft report on Salt and Health were collated, and the SSG issued a response on 7 316 
February 2003. The final Salt and Health report was published on 15 May 2003 (Scientific 317 
Advisory Committee on Nutrition, 2003b).  318 
In total 28 responses to the draft report were received, and the extended peer 319 
community included 10 corporate sector organisations, 8 NGOs, 7 professional or academic 320 
institutions, and 3 individual submitters.  321 
-Please Insert Text Box 1- 322 
 323 
Of the total number of respondents, 15 were in agreement with the conclusions, 2 324 
agreed with parts of the report, 4 respondents raised points but did not comment on the 325 
conclusions, and 7 did not agree with its conclusions. Organisations that were not 326 
supportive of the draft report were six corporate organisations and one individual. Table 2 327 
indicates that the most commentary came from the corporate sector or its membership 328 
organisations. Those who were in agreement with the main body of the report and its 329 
conclusions were mostly members of academic, professional, and non-governmental 330 
organisations (NGOs). 331 
-Please Insert Table 2- 332 
 333 
The extended peer community’s comments about the framing of the issue  334 
A considerable number of comments related to the way in which the SSG conducted the 335 
review. One of the key issues that emerged from submitters’ comments concerned the way 336 
the SSG framed the problem. Many questioned the health end-points taken into 337 
consideration, for instance a specific medical indicator of health such as blood pressure or a 338 
health outcome such as cardiovascular disease or mortality. Some stakeholders felt that the 339 
problem under consideration was framed in terms of risk of excessive intake, whilst it was 340 
felt that broadening this to include the risk of sodium deficiency would lead to substantively 341 
different conclusions. Many submitters requested broadening the scope of the review to 342 
include the role of other factors in hypertension. Others commented on the way in which 343 
certain concepts were defined and how this influenced the sourcing of evidence. For 344 
instance, comments were received about the lack of clarity about the choice of age bands 345 
for children, as well as the reasoning behind the decision not to separate recommendations 346 
for men and women. The majority of comments around the framing of the problem were 347 
submitted by those representing the corporate sector.  348 
A large number of comments addressed a perceived lack of transparency in the 349 
rationales for setting the boundaries of the problem frame. The respondents appeared to be 350 
unclear about the inclusion/exclusion criteria for the studies selected. There were also more 351 
general accusations of bias, lack of accuracy in interpreting the data and lack of clarity and 352 
consistency in reporting.  353 
One submitter questioned the legitimacy of the subgroup, querying the 354 
appropriateness of the current range of expertise selected to address the issue as 355 
framed by the Subgroup’s terms of reference.  356 
The extended peer community’s comments about the evidence 357 
A wide range of comments related to the way evidence was gathered, selected, and 358 
interpreted. There was considerable disagreement about the degree to which the list of the 359 
studies selected for inclusion was exhaustive: whilst some respondents felt that the breadth 360 
of studies from which evidence was drawn was too wide (e.g., animal studies), others felt it 361 
was partial (e.g., individual trials included, but few systematic reviews). It was also felt that 362 
the selection of the studies favoured short-term physiological effects over the long term 363 
impact of salt consumption on health. Some responses requested the broadening of the 364 
range of studies to include consideration of other factors influencing hypertension, rather 365 
than just salt consumption. A related point addressed the quality of evidence and 366 
commented on the inclusion of outdated studies in the review. Finally, a host of submissions 367 
centred on the Subgroup’s interpretation of the evidence presented and how the 368 
conclusions were drawn. Some submitters commented on the lack of an explicit account of 369 
what approach was used to evaluate evidence.  It was felt that too much weight was given 370 
to some studies, that the choice of terms to describe the new evidence (since the last COMA 371 
report) should be characterised as ‘more numerous’ rather than ‘stronger’, and that the 372 
potential dangers of sodium restriction had been ignored.  373 
The extended peer community’s comments about the SSG’s decision 374 
 The final recommendations for daily intake of sodium and how these were to be 375 
implemented attracted a range of respondents’ comments. Many submitters felt that the 376 
evidence reviewed failed to warrant the final conclusions reached by the SSG.   377 
The extent of stakeholder disagreement was further apparent in the diverse 378 
assessments of whether the Subgroup’s recommendations of 6g of salt per day was above 379 
or below the levels suggested by the reviewed evidence. For instance, an NGO queried why, 380 
despite the body of scientific evidence suggesting that 4g of salt per day should be the 381 
recommended dose, the current recommendation of 6g of salt a day was endorsed. On the 382 
other hand, a corporate sector submission characterised the target levels set for children as 383 
unrealistically low and unachievable, suggesting it could potentially deter consumption of 384 
foods of nutritional importance for children such as cheese and milk. One comment raised 385 
the expectation that the final recommendation must be in line with the internationally 386 
accepted values for salt, quoting the WHO’s recommended 5g of salt a day. A separate, 387 
though related point was the way in which the population group of interest was defined and 388 
conclusions generalised to the whole adult population.  389 
The challenges of translating the recommendations into policy, and the 390 
viability of possible implementation strategies were key concerns for many 391 
submitters. In particular, how the recommendation would be legislated around food 392 
labelling, whether implementation necessitated considerations of issues of food 393 
safety (e.g., the use of salt as a preservative), and what specific measures would be 394 
taken to achieve the target (e.g., how to marry up advice regarding processed food 395 
and discretionary consumer use of salt) were questions posed by a number of 396 
respondents. Some submitters felt that this was an opportunity to query the 397 
research commissioning process and the direction of further research. 398 
How influential was the extended peer community? 399 
The SSG produced a ‘response to the stakeholder submissions’ document on 7 400 
February 2003, during the 5th Meeting of the Subgroup noting possible modifications of the 401 
document in light of the stakeholder comments. They agreed with some of the comments 402 
around the issues of transparency and clarity of presentation, and for the most part, the SSG 403 
accepted criticism and agreed to amend the draft document to achieve greater clarity. Thus, 404 
for instance, the SSG agreed to provide a clear rationale for the evaluation of evidence and a 405 
rationale for why the report advocated a population-based approach. They also agreed to 406 
make editing changes to the document, including reiterating certain issues (e.g., future 407 
research) in the Conclusion section and amending wording in the text (e.g., from ‘stronger 408 
evidence’ to ‘larger body of evidence’). The concern raised around the legitimacy of the SSG 409 
in relation to the range of expertise within the SSG was rejected, though this decision was 410 
not elaborated.  411 
The issue that generated the most controversy and debate related to the selection 412 
criteria for the inclusion/exclusion of evidence for consideration. The committee chose 413 
selectively which comments pertinent to the selection and breadth of evidence to accept. 414 
Thus, for instance, the committee agreed to extend the review by widening the range of 415 
longer-term and meta-analytic studies included in the review as well as more recent dietary 416 
exposure surveys. The criticism suggesting that the SSG’s report gave disproportionate 417 
consideration to the animal studies was rejected, and justified as largely being pre-418 
determined by the terms of reference and the framing of the problem. Indeed, one of the 419 
key arguments justifying the selection criteria centred on what was thought to be restrictive 420 
terms of reference (or problem framing) for the workings of the SSG. However, our reading 421 
of the SSG’s responses suggests that the Subgroup in fact had some autonomy in how the 422 
problem was framed. Thus, in response to the request for an inclusion of other factors 423 
affecting hypertension in conjunction with salt (in order to provide a balanced review of the 424 
role of salt in health), the SSG emphasised some factors (e.g. physical activity and lifestyle), 425 
to the exclusion of others (e.g., genes). The basis for such prioritisation was not always 426 
made explicit..  427 
 The final recommendation that sodium intake was not to exceed 6g was reflective 428 
of the SSG’s judgments about the possibilities of achieving behaviour change in line with the 429 
recommendations, in the context of the large behavioural shifts required to move from the 430 
current 9g of average intake to the requirements of no more than 4g.   Although this 431 
decision was based on pragmatic considerations, the whole section of submitter comments 432 
focusing upon implementation of recommendations was rejected as being beyond the SSG’s 433 
scope of providing recommendations based on risk assessment.  434 
Before the revised report could be agreed on, the SSG sought the advice of another 435 
SACN subgroup, the Subgroup on Maternal and Child Nutrition (SMCN). A more specialist 436 
opinion was needed from experts on the adequacy of findings in children and infants. On 15 437 
May 2003, and after much deliberation SACN published the final Salt and Health report.  438 
Discussion and conclusions 439 
PNS theory posits that the management of controversial policy issues that draws 440 
upon often uncertain scientific evidence must recognise the value of engaging multiple 441 
perspectives not only in the policy process, but also in the scientific processes informing it. It 442 
has long been argued that scientific advisory committees, which exist on the boundary 443 
between scientific and political realm, are the clear contender for the post normal scientific 444 
practice (e.g. Lorenzoni, 2007; Farrell, 2011; van de Kerkhof and Leroy, 2000). However, the 445 
analytical focus thus far has been upon the way in which PNS is realised in the interaction 446 
between a SAB and a political body, whilst the extended peer community is studied as an 447 
emergent (rather than an intended) process. In the current paper we set out to examine 448 
PNS practice and the intended engagement with the extended peer community within the 449 
confines of the SACN SSG scientific decision-making. We have argued at the outset of this 450 
paper that the simultaneous expectation of independence of scientific advisors, and 451 
consultation with the extended peer community, will provide a particularly informative 452 
context to reflect on the value of PNS as a theoretical framework. The analysis of 453 
consultation summary documents represented a unique prism through which to study the 454 
processes of scientific decision-making. Whilst we recognise the inherent processes of re-455 
presentation of stakeholder views by those with responsibility for their use in science policy, 456 
the analysis of these documents provided useful insights into the ways in which the SACN 457 
SSG operated behind the scenes (‘back stage’) (Hilgartner, 2000). 458 
There are several points of discussion that emerge from the results. The current 459 
results confirm the value of PNS as a framework to describe the workings of the SSG since 460 
both the comments of submitters and the SSG’s responses fell outside the strict confines of 461 
risk assessment and addressed considerations stemming from the broader policy and 462 
political perspectives. However, the SSG’s relative autonomy in determining the framing of 463 
the issue ensured that they achieved a consistent scientific authority, more akin to the 464 
processes within “normal” science. In addition, whilst ostensibly consulting, the SSG 465 
continued to exercise authority in how stakeholder comments were addressed, referring 466 
strategically to scientific rationale or policy/political realities.   Thus scientific autonomy was 467 
successfully safeguarded in the face of alternative readings of the problem under scrutiny. 468 
We will discuss each of these points with reference to PNS. 469 
The thematic analysis of submitters’ comments makes apparent that the submitters’ 470 
reflections on the draft report were made in the context of the overall nutrition policy 471 
development process rather than its narrowly defined remit of risk assessment. One 472 
explanation is that submitters attributed to the SSG a more political role than formally 473 
ascribed, possibly as a reflection of its “boundary” position (Guston, 2001). In the context of 474 
salt, the stakeholders saw the risk assessment aspect of decision making inseparable from 475 
risk management. The current analysis suggests that such perception was not unwarranted: 476 
whilst the SSG maintained, at least formally, that their role was firmly within the risk 477 
assessment stage of decision-making, in practice, some of the decisions (e.g., 478 
recommendations) were based on pragmatic considerations of what was achievable and 479 
were only partially informed by the assessed scientific evidence. This provides some 480 
evidence for the validity of PNS framing of SABs activity since the risk management and 481 
communication elements of the issue are inextricably linked with the science/risk 482 
assessment as they provide context and bound science to political realities. 483 
 And yet, many of the submitters’ comments were rejected as ‘risk 484 
management/communication’ issues and deemed to be outside of the SSG’s remit. 485 
Literature has established that, in the effort to downplay the elements of judgment in the 486 
process of risk assessment, expert advisors “actively work to enact objectivity, separating 487 
themselves sharply from ‘vested interests’ that might seek to influence their advice”, thus 488 
downplaying diverse views (Hilgartner, 2000, p. 14-15; Martin, 2008). The SSG endorsement 489 
of the value of the EPC is at variance with their simultaneous efforts to distance themselves 490 
from the social and political realities. The confining of scientific advice to risk assessment as 491 
separate from the context of its application, which is explicit in the policy documents 492 
guiding the workings of the SACN, poses an additional pressure to exemplify objectivity, 493 
which in reality can lead to restrictive transparency (Walls et al, 2010). There is some 494 
evidence of this in our data– enacted in our case through strategic and partial addressing of 495 
the submitters’ comments.  496 
The analysis also demonstrated that the expert committee exercised a degree of 497 
autonomy in determining the scope of the review process through the decisions made 498 
about the inclusion and exclusion of evidence and the way in which certain concepts were 499 
defined. Considering the number of submissions reflecting on these issues, the framing of 500 
the problem appears to be an area where some debate and disagreement is evident. Even 501 
when the terms of reference for the expert committee are provided in no ambiguous terms 502 
(as was the case above), there appears to be area of ambiguity that will invite scrutiny and 503 
interest of the extended peer community – a clear evidence for the need for post normal 504 
scientific practice. In anticipation of the controversy, the SSG engaged the extended peer 505 
community explicitly both through consultation processes and by including an industry 506 
representative as a Committee Member (apparently to shape problem framing in line with 507 
the broader sets of values and interests). Despite adopting what is ostensibly PNS practice, 508 
however, the SSG appeared to be set on distancing itself from the demonstrable pressures 509 
of different interest groups through the repeated reference to the “objectivity” of risk 510 
assessment. This is particularly poignant in the light of the submissions analysed here which 511 
came mainly from the organisations with narrow specialisms (linked with nutrition and 512 
medical conditions associated with over consumption of salt), or vested interests (corporate 513 
sector, NGOs active in the area of nutrition). Very few submissions came from individual 514 
members of the public, and none were submitted from representatives of the target 515 
population as defined by the terms of reference (e.g., children).  Thus, the submissions were 516 
far from representative of the broad cross-section of perspectives and views.   This raises a 517 
practical question relevant to boundary organisations such as the SACN SSG about how the 518 
aims of PNS are to be achieved in the context of the simultaneous policy imperative of 519 
scientific independence from the vested interests.   520 
What we have witnessed through this analysis is therefore a curious contradiction 521 
between the engagement of a SAB with the extended peer community on one hand, and 522 
the simultaneous distancing from the consequences of such engagement through re-523 
assertion of scientific authority. Viewed in such light, the engagement with stakeholders on 524 
behalf of the SACN can be construed as a political act - to gain credibility and acceptance 525 
through PNS practice, whilst maintaining legitimacy as an independent body by deflecting 526 
the influence of controversial values and vested interests upon the decision outcomes.  527 
We can find theoretical resonance of this finding with the recently proposed concept 528 
of risk colonisation (Rothstein, 2004; Rothstein, 2006a,b). The concept has been put forward 529 
to explain the way in which an increased emphasis upon risk assessment in regulation has 530 
acted to amplify institutional risks (risks to the institution’s legitimacy, credibility and 531 
accountability) thus threatening institutions’ organisation and practices. The emphasis upon 532 
“good governance” that requires an organisation’s greater transparency and openness, 533 
consultation as well as constant accounting for their practices (to the wider audiences with 534 
often conflicting judgment criteria) has given rise to the practice of managing “institutional 535 
risks”. This creates a dual role for governing organisations: to govern societal risks whilst 536 
simultaneously managing their own institutional risks.   As the current analysis 537 
demonstrates, the SACN consultation process is as much a process of engaging in optimal 538 
risk assessment, as a way of managing sources of risk to its organisation. Thus, rather than 539 
being evidence of post normal scientific practice, the engagement became a mechanism for 540 
confirming the specific scientific practice that is resonant with technocratic models of 541 
science as “holding authority over the facts”. 542 
Examined in the context of a case study of the SSG consultation we can see the value 543 
of PNS as a normative framework though less support for its role as a theoretical model in 544 
explaining new modes of science practice. This may be partly due to the specific nature of 545 
our case of micronutrient recommendations which, though uncertain, complex, and often 546 
controversial and disputed, is nevertheless characterised by a degree of consensus about its 547 
overarching aim – to help achieve healthy population (Dhonukshe-Rutten et al, 2010). 548 
Scientists within scientific advisory committees for nutrition may see their role as the 549 
“guardians of public health”, their values aligned with those of the public and in conflict 550 
with food industry, and hence their science as a “quest for truth” rather than “quality 551 
control”. The evaluation of the extent to which the adoption of PNS aims in practice by SABs 552 
is the function of the nature of and interactions between the value networks clustered 553 
around an issue might provide useful insights into the applicability and limitations of PNS. 554 
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649 
Table 1: SACN SSG posted documents 650 
The document title 
 
Date of issue Summary of the document 
1st Meeting of SSG  
SACN/SaltSub 
SACN/SaltSub/02/min01 
25 January 
2002 
Members asked to express conflict of interest. 
The purpose of the group is clarified. The oral 
summary of the submissions of evidence by 
interested parties (e.g. Salt Manufacturers 
Association; Consensus Action on Salt and 
Health; Food and Drink Federation) is discussed.  
The draft framework of risk assessment (dated 
24/01/02) is considered and judged a useful 
checklist when considering and evaluating the 
evidence. 
2nd Meeting of SSG 
SACN/SaltSub 
SACN/SaltSub/02/min02 
18 April 2002 Framing of the problem to be addressed in 
terms of: 1) sodium as an essential nutrient; 
need to identify the physiological range of 
sodium required to maintain homeostasis and 
the associated individual variations; 2) relative  
importance of chloride ion; 3) salt sensitivity; 4) 
morbidity and mortality outcomes; 5) age-
related changes in the above areas. The relevant 
evidence is sought to address these areas. 
3rd Meeting of 
SSGSACN/SaltSub/02/min03 
21 May 2002 The SACN Secretariat proposes a structure for 
the draft report. The Subgroup proceeds to 
evaluate the collated evidence as per the 
The document title 
 
Date of issue Summary of the document 
problem frame defined at the previous meeting. 
 
The Members agree that, “on the basis of the 
evidence assessed to date, the 1994 COMA 
recommendation for a reduction in population 
average intake, to 100mmol (2.4g) of 
sodium (6g salt) per day, represented a 
pragmatic target, which was greater than the 
minimal requirement but represented an 
achievable objective for the population” (p. 3) 
The Subgroup needs to ascertain the adverse 
effects on certain sections of the population and 
to this end further review evidence. 
SACN Salt and Health Draft 
Report  
No longer available 
Circulated by 
the Secretariat  
The Subgroup finds no evidence to suggest that 
a reduction in salt to 6g/day for the adult 
population recommended by COMA in 1994 
would be a risk to health as the evidence to 
support it is now stronger. 
4th Meeting of 
SSGSACN/SaltSub/02/min04 
11 September 
2002 
Discussion of the draft statement on salt. 
Agreement about the way to characterise the 
studies reviewed; agreement that there is no 
evidence that the reduction of salt intake to 
6g/day (as per COMA report) would be a risk to 
The document title 
 
Date of issue Summary of the document 
health and the evidence is now stronger than in 
1994. Need for greater understanding of 
habitual intakes. Reduction to be achieved by 
changing content of food and drinks and dietary 
recommendations. Interested parties will be 
alerted to the draft and be given 1 month to 
comment on the draft. 
5th Meeting of SSG 
SACN/SaltSub/05/min01 
7 February 
2003 
 
Comments on the draft statement about salt 
received (after an extended consultation of 3 
months) and the Members agreed to go through 
the report section by section in order to 
incorporate agreed changes in the light of 
comments received. The responses are analysed 
in the main body of the Analysis of the paper. 
SACN SSG Summary of 
Responses Received to Request 
for Comments on Salt and 
Health Draft Report  
SACN/SaltSub/03/02/ 07/02/03 
7th Feb 2003 Responses summarised by the Secretariat of 
SACN. (We analyse them in our paper) 
SACN Final Salt and Heath 
Report  
TSO, Norwich 
15th May 2003 COMA recommendations upheld. There is now 
“larger” body of evidence to link salt 
consumption and hypertension. A public health 
approach to reduction in salt intake is required. 
 652 
 653 
Table 2: Key themes identified in the analysis of consultation documents654 
Key themes Extended peer community (N=28) Comments addressed by SACN 
SSG 
 Corporate NGO Academic/ 
professiona
l 
   Individual  
Framing      
Problem framing 11 1 1  Partially addressed 
Transparency  15 2 1  Addressed fully 
Range of expertise 1    Not addressed 
Evidence      
Type and breadth of 
evidence 
16 6 7 2 Partially addressed 
Quality of evidence 1  1  Partially addressed 
Interpretation 19 2 4 2 Partially addressed 
Decision      
Final recommendations 15 7 8 2 Addressed fully 
Implementation 15 12 1 1 Not addressed 
Conclusions 9  4  Addressed fully 
32 
 
Text box 1: The Extended Peer Community 
The extended peer community included the following organisations: 1. British Dietetic 
Association (BDA); 2. British Frozen Food Federation (BFFF); 3. British Nutrition 
Foundation (BNF); 4. British Retail Consortium (BRC); 5. Cochrane Heart Group (CHG); 6. 
Consensus Action on Salt and Health (CASH); 7. Co-operative Group (Co-op); 8. Food 
Commission (FC); 9. Food & Drink Federation (FDF); 10. Hooper L, Bartlett C, Davey Smith 
G, Ebrahim S; 11. Inside Story; 12. Institute of Food Science & Technology (UK) (IFST); 13. 
Intercollegiate Group on Nutrition (IGN); 14. LoSalt; 15. Macnair A; 16. McGee E; 17. 
Meat & Livestock Commission (MLC); 18. Medical Research Council, Human Nutrition 
Research (MRC HNR); 19. National Heart Forum (NHF); 20. National Osteoporosis Society 
(NOS); 21. Nutrition Society (NS); 22. Sainsbury’s; 23. Salt Institute (SI); 24. Salt 
Manufacturers’ Association (SMA); 25. Scottish Consumer Council (SCC); 26. Socialist 
Health Association (SHA); 27. Snacks, Nuts & Crisps Manufacturers Association 
(SNACMA); 28. Stroke Association (SA) 
